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Polish Households’ behavior  in the Regular and Informal Economies 
 
 
Abstract 
 
This paper analyzes characteristics of the informal economy in Poland in the 
context of transition, using a specific survey carried out in the framework of the classic 
Labor Force Survey, conducted by the Polish National Statistical office (GUS), in 1995. 
The participation probabilities of three types of informal activities (working, buying and 
hiring) are discussed. Their interdependencies are analyzed in the light of the hypothesis of  
network or neighborhood effects. The impact of a household’s participation in informal 
markets on its regular consumption is estimated by imputing the probability of its informal 
activity in the consumption surveys and panels. Such participation does significantly 
influence more than half of household’s expenditure on goods and services. Moreover, the 
participants of the informal economy distinguish themselves by higher individual full prices  
(integrating  both  monetary  and non-monetary constraints and resources). 
 
Key words: Informal economy, consumer behavior, cross-section-panel estimation  
JEL codes: D12 H26 J49 C31 C32  
 Ce papier analyse les caractéristiques de l’économie informelle  en Pologne dans le 
contexte de la transition en utilisant une enquête originale effectuée par l’office statistique 
polonais GUS au sein de l’enquête  classique sur l’emploi en 1995. Dans un premier temps 
les probabilités de participation dans trois types d’activités informelles (travail, embauche, 
achat) sont discutées en particulier en relation avec l’hypothèse de présence des effets de 
réseau ou de voisinage. Ensuite on analyse l’impact de la participation à l’économie 
informelle sur  la consommation de ménages en imputant la probabilité de participation aux 
activités informelles dans l’enquête et dans  le panel de consommation. On constate que la 
probabilité de participation influence significativement les dépenses de plus de la moitié des 
ménages. De plus,  les ménages participant à l’économie informelle se distinguent par un 
niveau  plus élevé des prix complets individuels (qui intègrent des contraintes et des 
ressources à la fois monétaires et non monétaires).      
 
Mots clés: L’économie informelle, comportement  de consommation, estimation en coupe transversale 
                 et en panel  
codes JEL : D12 H26 J49 C31 C32  
Document de Travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne - 2009.17
 3 
 
Introduction 
 
 During the transition period, as experienced by Poland after the liberalization of 
foreign and domestic markets on the 1st January 1990, the old type of informal market 
activities gradually disappeared as the official markets got stronger. However, new informal 
activities were created simultaneously due to the appearance of constraints on households or 
firms. For instance, subsistence constraints are likely to have appeared for households in 1989 
and 1990, which might have obliged households to seek new sources of revenue and to 
minimize food prices by operating in black markets. The gradual definition of the limits and 
organization of official markets may also have created new legal constraints for firms, which 
may then have used unofficial channels to weaken their transaction costs. It is particularly 
important to analyze the behavior of households in informal markets during this period, as a 
means of predicting whether the informal economy will disappear soon after first appearing 
during a transition, or whether it is likely to persist as a permanent structure (see Dupaigne-
Hénin, 2001). Three reasons may drive households into the black market: first the search for 
cheaper commodities in monetary terms. Second, rationing, which is essentially the same as 
the first cause, commodities being cheaper on the black market when the sum of monetary and 
the virtual prices arising from constraints and non-monetary resources is taken into account.  
Third, the participation in one area of the informal economy, for instance by working 
unofficially, may create social interactions which lowers the cost of other unofficial activities, 
like buying goods on the black market (see Fortin-Lacroix-Montmarquette, 2000). Therefore, 
by considering both the participation of a household in informal markets and its official labor 
supply and consumption, we are able to answer two questions. First, does the participation in 
various informal market activities which are interdependent give rise to a multiplier effect? 
This is a question posed by Fortin-Lacroix-Montmarquette (2000) for working and buying 
activities. Second, is informal consumption driven mainly by a minimizing behavior, whereby 
households search for lower prices, minimizing the risk of participating in black markets, or 
rather by the appearance of subsistence constraints due to the transition? In the latter case, 
informal markets should disappear rapidly as the subsistence constraints faced by households 
during the transition phase. 
This paper also presents some essential facts about informal markets in Poland during 
the transition and proposes a statistical matching method to measure the income effect of 
informal activities on regular expenditures. In Section 1, we present some historical and 
methodological comments of how the hidden economy was measured in Poland at the macro 
and micro levels, during the transition period. In Section 2, we define and estimate the 
participation probabilities including several types of informal economic activities: working, 
buying consumer goods and services or unregistered hiring. We also analyze the socio- 
economic profiles of the participating households and interactions between different types of 
informal activities. Our data source in this part is an original, large-scale informal economy 
survey conducted together with classic Labour Force Survey (Extended LFS) in Poland in 
1995 (see Appendix 2 for details). In Section 3, we estimate the impact of informal market 
participation probabilities on the regular consumption patterns, using the extended LFS 
survey, matched statistically with the 1995 Household Budget Survey (HBS) and with the 
consumption panel derived from the 1994-1996 time-series data of the HBS (see Appendix 2 
for details). The specific consumption behavior characteristics of participants in informal 
markets are analyzed by estimating the cross-section and panel of the Almost Ideal DS-
QAIDS models, for the 1994-1996 period.     
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 1.  Measuring the Determinants and Effects of Informal Market Participation 
within the Context of Transition  
  
Informal economic activity is a natural market reaction in the presence of 
governmental (or institutional) interventions and regulations (Fortin 2002). In an economy 
where the market is not fully regulated (as in centrally planned economies and to a lesser 
extent transition economies) different types of rationing can also be a cause of strong informal 
sectors. Economic agents try to avoid the implied constraints or extra costs through different 
types of participation in the informal economy. Thus, the size and evolution of the informal 
sector depends on the characteristics and extent of state or institutional restrictions. 
By comparing the size of the informal economy across different types of countries 
(developed, developing and countries in transition) using the same methodology (DYMIMIC 
macroeconomic model, Schneider (2007)) it is possible to obtain an idea of the relative 
importance of informal markets in various countries in the world, with respect to their 
economic status. The average size of informal economies in transition countries (39% of PIB) 
is higher than in the most developed countries (14%), but lower than in the developing 
countries (42%). Among transition countries there is also great heterogeneity. The estimated 
share of Poland’s informal economy in 2004/2005 was  27% of GDP, below the average for 
all transition countries, but higher than in Central European transition countries: (Hungary 
(25%), the Slovak Republic (18%) and the Czech Republic (18%). 
 
In Poland, the informal economy has always existed, as in other transition countries. 
But its character and nature changed dramatically during the transition period. 
 In the pre-transition period, the formal-informal duality of the economy was based 
mainly on multiple economic disequilibria resulting from the coexistence of generalized 
rationing with administered prices and almost free, informal market sectors with equilibrium 
prices for the same goods and services. A specific role was played by dual (formal and 
informal) foreign currency regulations. They acted as an equilibrium factor on the supply- 
constrained official consumer market by giving the opportunity of access to  the unconstrained 
consumer market. The use of time by queuing was another informal adjustment  factor both 
for working and non working people. Indeed formal  working  time in state enterprises was 
often  shared with informal private activities like working informally or queuing. The labor 
market was constrained on the demand side by quasi-permanent workforce shortages for 
employers, generating various forms of formal and informal adjustments like multi-
employment situations for employees. The peculiar characteristics of informal markets within 
the centrally planned Polish economy are described in detail in Starzec 1983, and explained 
within the framework of a disequilibrium model in Charemza (1982, 1990). 
The transition from a centrally planned to a market economy changed the character and 
nature of disequilibria and constraints, generating new forms of formal-informal duality in the 
economy. Vanishing shortages in goods and services markets were replaced by new 
disequilibria, especially in the labor market with the emergence of unemployment and its 
associated, specific social protection (contributions and benefits). At the same time, the 
liberalization of the economy, and the rapid growth of the private sector were accompanied by 
large-scale public finance reforms. The most important ones were the introduction of 
progressive income tax, of Value Added Tax (VAT), the individualization of social 
contributions and old age pension reform. These changes created the new conditions for 
informal economic development, similar to those observed in traditional market economies. 
The opening of borders expanded considerably informal, international commercial activities 
(smuggling) and informal labor migration (see CASE, 2007). Thus, the most important effect 
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of the transition from an administrated economy of shortage to a market economy with state 
regulation was a shift from a situation of consumption constraints to one of employment 
constraints, each with corresponding informal market behaviors. The transformation of  
informal markets was similar in several central European countries (Hungary, Czech 
Republic, Slovakia), but differed for Russia (Kurkchiyan, Marina. 2000) and  the former 
Soviet Union Republics, where both the pre-transition and post-transition situations have been 
institutionally and politically more specific, and extremely heterogeneous (e.g. for Georgia see 
Bernabè, Stampini (2008)).  When compared to other Central European countries, Poland’s 
specificity has been related to the peculiar situation of the agricultural sector both before and 
during the transition. Under central planning, Poland was characterized by a relatively open 
economy and the presence of a very large private sector in agriculture (90% of output). During 
the transition period, agriculture became potentially the most important part of the informal 
labor market because of its high unemployment levels (GUS 1996) and the characteristics of 
the tax regime (lump sum taxation). 
Several sources of information must often be combined to obtain the most plausible 
image of the informal market reality. The macroeconomic evaluation methods try to correct 
the GDP aggregates for unregistered activities (Schneider, 2007) whereas microeconomic 
approaches try to correct the individual income and expenditure distribution for informal 
market participation effects. Moreover, the microeconomic approach is essentially oriented to 
the question of the cost-benefit utility maximization problem of tax evasion (Cowell, 1985, 
1990), and more generally to an individual’s economic and social reasons for participating in 
informal markets. 
The classic micro-economic question of the trade-off between participating in formal 
or informal labor markets was formalized by Fortin and Lacroix (1992), in a structural model 
maximizing an individual’s expected utility. However, the hidden nature of the informal 
economy and the resulting lack of specific individual information make the estimation of a 
structural model very complex. Most econometric applications use it in a reduced form. 
 Another difficulty lies in taking into account the risks of control, the cost of legal 
penalties and moral stigma in evaluating informal market participation when active policies 
exist to sanction underground activities. Fortin et al, 2004 discussed this problem and 
proposed an econometric model for informal market participation in this context. 
Similarly the role of social interactions (Mansky, 2000), network effects or 
neighborhood effects (Fortin et al 2002) in the informal activities are discussed in the 
literature but are difficult to deal with in empirical research because of identification problems 
and the lack of specific data. More recent work on the role of social interactions uses 
experimental data (Fortin et al 2007) with somewhat debatable empirical results, because they 
are based on artificially composed groups of taxpayers, and are difficult to extrapolate to the 
entire population. 
Our approach is based on the same microeconomic background analyzing the causes 
and interactions between different informal behaviors. We analyze informal market 
participation decisions, taking advantage of an original survey specifically devoted to the 
study of informal activities, conducted in Poland in 1995 during the transition period (see 
GUS, 1996). In particular, we analyze the differences and links between various types of 
underground activities (buying, hiring and working) and discuss the existence of network 
effects (Section 1). Then we propose an original method to investigate the links between 
consumer behavior and informal market participation, based on statistically matched data for 
consumption and informal activities (Section 2). This analysis allows the identification of the 
specific consumption patterns of informal market participants. 
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1.1 General Characteristics of Informal Market Participation in Poland, in 1995 2  
 
Informal Work  
 
Within the transition context, the central question lies in analyzing informal work 
patterns in Poland as a dysfunction of the labor market, but also as a collateral phenomenon of 
unemployment and tax evasion. How do people explain the reasons of participating in the 
informal labor market (Table 1)? In 1995, most of them (63%) indicated insufficient income 
or the inability of finding an official job (39%). Too high taxes also motivated almost 25% of 
people moonlighting, but only 10% feared losing their means tested benefits if working in the 
official market. Generally the male-female distribution of responses to these questions is 
similar, except for persons indicating the financial advantage of working without a contract, 
which was more frequent for women that for men. Younger and better educated people cite 
tax evasion more frequently as a reason for working without a formal contract, than do others 
who stressed more the need for extra income. Generally, the income constraint appears as the 
main reason for moonlighting. 
 
The most frequent types of hidden activities are agriculture and gardening (25%), 
construction and home fitting (14.2%), car repairs and transport (12%) and so-called 
neighborhood services (13%). The majority of moonlighters are aged between 25 and 44 
(52%). Participation in the informal labor market is found in all education groups, but most 
frequently concerns people with vocational and primary school education (38%). 
Almost all socio-demographic groups are concerned by informal work. However, 
activities of the hidden economy are observed more frequently among low-skilled workers and 
jobs which do not need high qualifications. It seems that these activities are mainly caused by 
insufficient income and dysfunctions in official labor markets. Similarly, hiring moonlighters 
appears to reflect the search for low cost labor, a kind of golden opportunity rather than a 
systematic choice for tax evasion. As stressed by Kalaska and Witkowski (1996), informal 
work “is a form of survival of both employers and those employees who have no chances in 
the official market”. 
In the post-transition period surveyed in  (2004), a similar study (GUS, 2005) showed 
relatively  few changes in attitudes and opinions  towards the informal activities. However, the 
shift from transition to post-transition period weakened significantly the economic constraint, 
and  strengthened the tax burden effect, as reasons for informal labor market participation. 
Indeed, the lack of alternatives to informal work and the heavy tax burden were declared more 
often in 1995 than in 2004 as causes for taking up an  informal work, whereas insufficient 
incomes were a less frequent motivation of informal activities in 2004 than in 1995. However, 
their respective ranks among the main motivations of participating in the informal labor 
market remained the same. Moreover, the differences in opinions observed in 1995 were 
almost unchanged in 2004, whatever the sex, age, education group or the locality.    
 
 Informal Market Participation 
 
The analysis of informal labor market participation can be enlarged to the other 
underground activities: buying and hiring, following the explicit responses in the available 
                                                     
2
 Based on the Extended Labor Force Survey (ELFS) 1995. See Appendix A1 for details. 
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survey. We define “informal market participation” as a positive response by anyone involved 
in one of the three informal activities (working, buying, or hiring). 
We consider that a household participates in parallel activities if at least one of its 
members does so. In Table 2, we present some general statistics about household’s 
participation in the different types of underground activities. Almost 22% households are 
present in at least one of the informal markets through one of its members: 15% in buying, 
7.4% in working and 6.8% in hiring.  
Almost 18% of households were present in the informal labor market. About 1.6% of 
households combined both working and hiring. 2.5% were buying and working and more than 
5% were buying and hiring informally. This interdependence of certain informal activities will 
be discussed later in this section. 
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Table 1 
Opinions on the Reasons for Taking up Unregistered Employment in 1995 
(as % of the total).* 
*several responses possible 
Source: GUS  Extended Labor Force Survey  (1995), Kalaska, Witkowski, 1996. 
 
 
Table 2 
Frequencies of the Different Forms of Participation in the Informal Economy  
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
      Nature of informal activities           Nb obs     Mean   Std Dev 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Households 
 
Buying in informal markets   10390     0.154     0.361 
Working in informal markets   10390     0.074     0.262 
Hiring in informal markets   10390     0.068     0.252 
Participating (at least in one out of three)     10390     0.217     0.412 
 
Working or hiring in informal markets         10390     0.179      0.383 
Working and hiring in informal markets      10390     0.016     0.125 
Buying and working  in informal markets    10390  0.025     0.157 
Buying and hiring in informal markets        10390  0.053    0.224 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Source: Computed from GUS  Extended Labor Force Survey  (1995) 
 
 
Specification Total Men Women  Urban Rural 
Insufficient income 63.0 61.6 64.2 63.1 62.7 
Inability to find an official 
job 
38.9 38.6 39.3 35.6 44.6 
Higher incomes without a 
contract 
16.2 18.1 14.5 17.2 14.6 
Family or personal situation 8.7 6.7 10.4 8.9 8.2 
Too high taxes 24.2 26.8 21.8 26.0 21.1 
High social security 
contributions 
16.0 17 2 15.0. 16.8 14.7 
Unwillingness to hold a 
permanent job (flexibility) 
1.3 1.5 1.2 1.2 1.5 
Fear of losing certain 
benefits 
10.3   10.7 10.0 10.9 9.3 
Other 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1  0.1 
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 Socio-Economic Profiles and Participation Probabilities 
 
The definition of participation here is the participation declared by any person in the 
household, in any informal activity (buying, working, hiring) permanently or occasionally. We 
consider that the household’s situation and needs determine the demand for informal market 
goods, services and activities. Another hypothesis following the same logic is to consider that 
one informal activity induces another, which can be done by the same person or any other 
member of the same household. 
Overall the probability of a household’s participation increases with the number of 
children. It is also higher in the countryside in families of farmers or when persons have a dual 
activity along with working on a farm. Unemployment of the head of the household is a strong 
factor increasing the probability of informal participation, while age reduces it. University 
education increases considerably and significantly the probability of participation, while other 
education categories have no significant impact (Appendix Table B1). 
The socio-economic profiles of participants change if various types of informal 
activities (working, buying, hiring) are taken into account (see Appendix table B1). 
a. As expected, unemployment increases significantly the probability of doing 
unregistered work, but reduces informal buying. 
b. Male heads of household have a higher probability of working or hiring without formal 
contracts than females, but a lower probability of buying in the informal market.  
c. Living in a area where unemployment is lower than the national average is related to a 
higher  probability of hiring and a lower probability of working informally (which seems 
natural). In contrast, in areas of higher than average unemployment, the probability of 
working informally is significant and higher than in the areas with average   
unemployment. 
d. There is no significant difference in the probability of participating in any informal 
activity with respect to the age, except for people over 60 for whom informal work is 
significantly lower than for others. This is related very probably to their generally lower 
participation in the labor market.  
e. The probability of participation does not vary for inhabitants of cities and towns, except 
for informal hiring, which rises significantly with the size of conurbation. However, 
living in the countryside raises very significantly the chances of participating in all 
informal activities. 
f. Similarly, farmers or people with dual occupations (farmers and wage earners) have a 
higher and significant probability of participating in all informal activities than do wage 
earners. The self-employed have a higher probability of working informally, but not 
buying nor hiring. 
g. The education level has a small influence on participation behavior: high school 
education reduces the probability of working informally, whereas university education 
increases the probability of buying in informal markets.  
h. The family situation has a small impact on informal activities: participation rises with 
the number of children with the most significant outcomes for informal work. Buying and 
hiring informally are more probable for families with 3 children than for smaller ones. 
  
Generally, the probability of all kinds of informal activities occurring is highest in 
rural areas.  Working without a formal contract is most frequent among the unemployed or in 
the areas with relatively high unemployment. Informal hiring activities are more probable in 
cities but also among families with several children.  The high probability of informal buying 
is related to the head of household’s education and the presence of a large family.  
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In short, the relationships with respect to the informal activities appear to depend on a 
household’s income or labor market situation, its rural or urban environment. But, they are 
age independent, excepting the fall in the “natural” labor supply by the elderly.  
          
 
The Interdependence of Buying, Working and Hiring in Informal Markets  
 
Following Fortin et al, 2002, we examine the existence of interdependence of various 
informal activities, by enlarging the analysis to the three types of informal market activities: 
working, buying and hiring without formal contracts, in the context of the Polish transition 
economy. We test the hypothesis of interdependence using a recursive bivariate probit model 
of the probability of buying goods and services informally, combined with other informal 
activities (working or hiring without formal contracts) by including  them as regressors in the 
buying equation. We estimate three models combining (a) working and buying, (b) hiring and 
buying, (c) working or hiring and buying using seemingly unrelated regressions allowing for 
the correlation of residuals. 
In order to take into account the possible endogeneity of dependent variables used as 
regressors, we use the following estimation procedure. Firstly, we include the regional 
unemployment variables only in the equation of the probability of working (or hiring) 
supposing that there is little interdependence between them and the informal buying. 
Secondly, we instrument the dependent variable of the first equation (probability of working, 
hiring and buying or hiring) by simple probit method and put the instrumented value as a 
regressor into the buying equation. 
The system is  composed of the two equations corresponding to each type of informal 
activity (with social and economic determinants as explanatory variables). This system is 
estimated  by maximum likelihood with exogeneity constraints obtained by excluding some of 
the explanatory variables from one equation. The summary results of the three models 
estimated in terms of marginal effects are presented in the Table 3. The full results are given 
in Appendix B, Tables B2-B4. 
- (1) The marginal effect of working in the informal market (i.e. shifting from 0 to 1, 
where 1 is working informally) raises the probability of also buying informally by 
0.45. More generally, any participation in the informal labor market (working or 
hiring) increases the probability of buying by 0.48. These effects are particularly 
high, when compared with the average probability of participating in the informal 
consumer market which is 0.15.    
- (2) The closest relationship is observed between hiring and buying informally. The 
marginal effect obtained (0.50) means that hiring informally increases the 
probability of buying informally by 50 percent. 
The estimated high marginal effects confirm the presence of social network or 
neighborhood effects which raise the probability of households participating in other informal 
markets when they are already active in one informal market. Moreover the results show a 
strong interdependency among various informal activities, suggesting that participating in any 
one of them can be a significant determinant explaining households’ behavior.  
 
We develop this conclusion in the next section, taking into consideration the influence 
of the informal market participation on households’ consumer behavior in regular markets.    
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Table 3 
Probability of Buying, Working and Hiring in Informal Markets           
Recursive bivariate probit model  
 marginal effects 
 
variable dy/dx dy/dx dy/dx 
 Work+buy Hire+buy Hire or work+buy 
Working in informal markets 
(instrumented) 0,451* 0,499* 0,484* 
Head of household unemployed -0,106 -0,044* -0,095* 
Inactive -0,075* -0,019 -0,026* 
Head of household aged less than 
30 0,030* 0,018 0,029* 
Head of household aged 30-39 0,033* 0,013 0,032* 
Head of household aged 40-60 0,091* 0,022 0,070* 
University level education 0,068* 0,056* 0,096* 
High school level education 0,030 0,015 0,053* 
Primary school level education 0,019 0,010 0,026 
Farmers 0,179* -0,010 0,022 
Dual activity (farmers+wage 
earners) 0,076* -0,009 0,013 
Pensioners 0,057* 0,022* 0,029* 
Self-employed -0,009 - -0,031 
One child -0,003 0,004 -0,013 
Two children -0,014 -0,006 -0,030* 
Three children or more -0,029* 0,003 -0,041* 
 
* Significant at the 90% level.See Appendix B Tables B2-B4 for detailed estimation results. 
Source: Computed from GUS  Extended Labor Force Survey  (1995). 
 
 
 
2. Participation in Informal Markets and Household Expenditures in Regular Markets 
 
We conclude from Section 2 that a household’s participation in the informal labor 
market may create a positive network effect on hiring labor services, or purchasing goods in 
the black market. Both of these expenditures may influence regular consumption because of 
substitution between regular and informal expenditures. Thus, both modes of participating in 
informal institutions may change expenditure in regular markets. Indeed, if informal activities 
influence regular consumption, then the estimation of regular demand as recorded in 
Household Budgets surveys may be biased whenever these informal activities are not taken 
into account. Moreover, considering them as potential explanatory variables may reduce part 
of the endogeneity biases which appear in cross-section estimations, and which are caused by 
the existence of permanent, latent (unobserved) variables (see Gardes et al., 2005, for the 
biases of income elasticities computed on cross-sections). We try to deepen analysis of this 
question by proposing an approach combining microeconomic consumer behavior analysis 
based on typical household budget data, with information about the participation in informal 
markets contained in the Labor Force survey: integrating an index of unofficial activities in 
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the equation for regular consumption may greatly improve cross-section estimates of all 
variables which are correlated, in the cross-section dimension, to these unofficial activities. 
The result would be cross-section estimates closer to time-series estimates, which would solve 
the puzzle discussed in Gardes et al. (2005). 
In order to test for this dependency, we have imputed the probability of participating in 
informal markets for each household  from  the Family Expenditures surveys. For this analysis 
we use two statistically matched surveys: (i) the extended Labor Force Survey 1995 (ELFS 
1995) containing specific information on informal economy participation (used in the 
previous section); and (ii) the Household Budget Survey (HBS 1995) with the associated four-
year panel data (1993-1996) (see Appendix 2 for more  details). First, demand systems are 
estimated for both time-series (panel) and cross-section data, including the information on the 
participation in informal markets. Second, the income elasticities are compared between sub-
populations with different participation probabilities. This comparison can indicate to what 
extent the use of informal markets is an economic constraint rather than a “golden 
opportunity” simply allowing goods and services to be bought at lower price level.  
 
2.1. Specification, Econometric Methodology and Data-base Construction 
  
The first step consists in setting up an appropriate data-base. We use a regression based 
matching procedure to impute the informal market participation probabilities from ELFS 1995 
into the 1994-96 Panel of Household Budget Surveys and the 1995 Household Budget Survey 
(HBS). The estimated model of participation in the informal economy based on the 1995 
ELFS Survey (see Section 1 and Table B1 in the Appendix B) is applied to predict the 
participation probabilities of each household in the panel and the survey (HBS), using similar 
household characteristics. These predicted probabilities are added as explanatory variables in 
the demand systems analysis. Our hypothesis is that the households participating and not 
participating in informal markets may behave differently, with respect to their socio-economic 
characteristics, when facing a change in income, relative prices or other determinants of their 
consumption. We test this hypothesis estimating an Almost Ideal Demand System and a 
Quadratic Almost Ideal Demand System (QAIDS), on panel and cross-section expenditure 
data with the imputed information about informal market participation. The estimation of the 
Quadratic Almost Ideal Demand System QAIDS has been made using the convergence 
algorithm proposed by Banks et al. (1997): for the linear Almost Ideal Demand System 
specification we have  
         
wiht = αi +π  i part + Σj γij ln pjt + βi ln [mht/a(pt)] +  Zht.δi + uiht     (2.1a) 
 
 
For the Quadratic specification        (2.1b) 
 
wiht = αi + π i part + Σj γij ln pjt + βi ln [mht/a(pt)] + {[λi/b(pt)] ln [m/a(p)]}2 + Zht.δi + uiht,   
 
with:  ln a(pt) =  α0 + Σj αi ln pit + 0.5 ΣiΣj γij ln pit.ln pjt     and    b(pt) = Πi pitβi  
 
where wiht is the budget share for good i, individual h and period t, pit the price of good i, mht 
is household’s total income in period t, part the imputed probability of the household’s 
members participation in informal activities and Zht all other socio-economic variables. 
Because of the possible endogeneity due to measurement errors of the income variable, it is 
instrumented by the total expenditure, the head of household’s age and his/her social category. 
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As the estimated parameters αi, βi, γij bring non-linearity into the equation, a first step 
consists in estimating equation (2.1b), using a Stone price index a(pt) =   with  the 
average budget share of good i for individuals and periods  (that is, imposing α0 = γij = 0 and 
αi =  in the true price index a(pt)). Price elasticities can be corrected to take into account the 
difference between the exact price index a(pt) and the Stone index, as described by Pashardes 
(1990). In the second step, the βi estimated are used to compute b(pt). At each step, b(pt) is 
updated and the system is linear in its parameters. This procedure ensures that the quadratic 
specification which is estimated corresponds to the integrable QAIDS system. 
Blundell and Robin (1999) proved the consistency and asymptotic efficiency of this 
iterative procedure compared to the maximum likelihood estimate. The estimation is made 
under the sole additivity assumption, as homogeneity is not accepted by the data, except for 
clothing (note that the results are similar when homogeneity is constrained). The “between” 
and “within” parameters are estimated by pooling the three surveys with quarter and period 
dummies, to take into account all institutional changes. The convergence process is rather 
low, b(p) converging at the 75th iteration.  
 
2.2. The Effect of Informal Market Participation on the Consumer Behavior  
 
 The Almost Ideal Demand System model (2.1a) is estimated on the 1995 Polish  
Household Budget Survey for 10 aggregated consumption items, considered as a demand 
system with budget constraint (Appendix B, Table B5). Then, a panel sample covering the 
period 1994-1996 is used for a system estimation (Appendix B, table B6). The final 
estimation (Appendix B, Table B7) is performed using the same panel sample applying the 
quadratic version of the model (QAIDS). This leads to three conclusions:  
 
(a) The estimated coefficients of the probability of participation in the informal 
economy are very close for the separate, equation-by-equation, demand system and between 
transformed data estimates, except for the item Culture and Education (traditionally a poorly 
defined category). For six groups of commodities out of eleven, the estimated probability of 
participating in the black market has a significant effect on regular expenditures in all types of 
estimation (see Tables B6 and B7 in Appendix B). The effect is clearly positive for Food, 
Alcohol and Tobacco, Transport and Communication, with values from 10% to 30% of the 
budget share, with an average probability of 0.3. The coefficient is negative for all other 
product groups, especially for three services: Health, Education and Cultural expenditures 
(note that, under the additivity restriction, the coefficients for all groups sum to 0). Such a 
negative effect of participation in the informal economy corresponds to a substitution between 
informal and regular expenditures: expenditures for goods or services in informal markets 
substitute for official expenditures. This substitution may be important for the three services 
which have the larger negative coefficients. A positive effect may be due to the influence of 
latent variables both on participation in informal markets and on the regular expenditures. 
Suppose, for instance, that the household is relatively poor in its reference population. This 
relative position tends to increase its food expenditures, compared to the normal effect of its 
current income (see Gardes, 2007, for the theory and an empirical analysis of this relative 
income effect). On the other hand, relative poverty increases the tendency of participating in 
informal markets, so that a positive relationship appears between these two variables.3 
                                                     
3
 The income from the informal labor market may also increase the consumption in excess of the share explained 
by official income declared by the household, when a household does not include its unofficial income in its 
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Therefore, income effects computed independently of a household’s relative income position 
would under-estimate its food consumption and artificially create a positive effect of the 
probability of participating. Conversely, luxury goods such as culture or health expenditures 
may be over-estimated. In a sense, the inclusion of this probability among the determinants of 
household expenditure controls for relative income effects. It is important to take into account 
both variables – relative income and black market participation – but this requires modeling 
explicitly the relative income effects, which is a difficult task. 
 
Table 4 
AI Demand System Cross-Section Estimates of the Change in Budget Shares,  
According to the Probability of Participating in the Informal Economy 
 
Expenditure groups Income 
elasticity 
Participation 
probability 
Average 
budget share 
    
Food 0.64723 0.181289 0.448 
  (5.028 )  
Alcohol and tobacco 0.65111 0.011839 0.034 
  (1.015)  
Clothing 1.49340 -0.045741 0.064 
  (-2.177)  
Dwelling  (charges) 0.87026 -0.008299 0.184 
  (-0.241)  
Dwelling (equipment) 2.19828 0.018621 0.032 
  (1.008 )  
Health 1.08289 -0.087720 0.042 
  (-5.857)  
Hygiene 0.97142 -0.004439 0.034 
  ( -0.642)  
Education 0.91242 -0.066810 0.018 
  ( -7.172)  
Culture 1.73049 -0.093797 0.047 
  (-5.255 )  
Transport and communication 1.86568 0.084119 0.078 
  (0.606)  
 
1. Student (robust) statistics in parenthesis. 
2. Income instrumented by total expenditure and socio-demographic variables. 
3. Income elasticities computed at the average level of budget share. 
Source: Computed from GUS Household Budget Survey (1995). 
Number of observation: 31857. 
 
(b) The comparison of the total expenditure elasticities (estimated by QAIDS) 
for two sub-populations – participating or non-participating households – is given in 
Table 4. Half of the commodity groups have different time-series elasticities for the 
two sub-populations, but the order between the elasticities of the participating or non-
participating households is not the same for cross-section and time-series elasticities. 
Moreover, those commodities which are characterized by a large positive influence of 
participation (estimated in the constant) do not have a higher income elasticity (in the 
“within dimension”) in the participating population. Perhaps the three types of 
participation do not have similar effects concerning the income elasticity.  
                                                                                                                                                                      
income declaration, but the specification on instrumented total expenditure theoretically excludes such an under-
estimation. 
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Table 5 
Income Elsticity According to the Household’s Participation in the Informal Economy 
 
 Participating > Non-
Participating 
Participating < Non-
Participating 
Cross-section Elasticity Dwellings (charges) Clothing, Dwelling 
(equipment) 
 
Time-series Elasticity Clothing, Transport and 
Communication 
Food, Miscellaneous 
 
Source: Computed from GUS  Household Budget panel  (1994-1995) (4809 observation per year).  
 
  The explanation of the order between time-series elasticities, which are theoretically 
unbiased by the existence of permanent latent variables (the cross-section elasticities can be 
biased in this case), cannot rely on relative income considerations: a continuous increase of 
households’ income may not provoke a substitution between unofficial and official 
commodities, thus no endogenous bias may appear in the time-series income elasticities. The 
order of these time-series elasticities may perhaps be partly explained by varying consumer 
behavior between rural and non-rural households. It can be also observed that participating 
households have higher income-elasticities for commodities which are already highly elastic 
(clothing, dwelling charges, transport and communication), as if the supplementary income 
from informal activities or savings due to smaller prices on the black market are principally 
spent on groups of luxury commodities. 
 It should be noted that it is highly plausible that the different types of participation in 
the informal sector differ between the rich and the poor: the former may buy unofficial goods 
and hire employees in the informal sector, while the latter may also buy goods (but different 
types of commodities) and sell their work informally. So, it may be important to differentiate 
these three types of participation to analyze consumption patterns and the constraints faced by 
the population. 
(c)  Another interesting feature of these statistics lies in the revealed choice conditions 
through the computation of shadow prices, corresponding to rationing constraints or the 
existence of non-monetary resources. Such hidden determinants have been proved to explain 
the frequent biases in cross-section elasticities, compared to time-series. These shadow prices 
are defined by changing consumption, through price effects, in exactly the same amount as the 
change which is attributed to some latent variable. They measure, in price terms, the influence 
of this unobserved latent variable. For instance, optimizing under a rationing constraint (or 
conditionally on a definite amount of time spent in the consumption activity) lowers the 
optimal expenditure for the constrained commodity by exactly the same amount as that which 
is driven, through some calibrated direct price elasticity, by a price increase of a certain value 
for this commodity (see Appendix in Gardes et al., 2005; details and a more general model 
can be found in Gardes, 2008). Table 6 presents these shadow prices for participating and 
non-participating households. Shadow prices are negatively related to a household’s income, 
when it participates in the informal economy. In contrast, they are positively related to income 
for non-participating households. This means that full prices (integrating these shadow prices) 
are greater for the poor among participating households, and vice-versa for rich non-
participating households, which may create an incentive for the poor to gain from their 
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participation in informal markets. The analysis thus shows an important economic 
determinant of the participation in the informal economy, and explains why this participation 
is more frequent among poor households. 
 
Table 6 
Shadow Prices for Participating and Non-Participating Households 
 
Commodity 
group 
Budget share Participating 
households 
Non-
participating 
households 
Food 0.448 -2.45 -0.47 
Alcohol-
Tobacco 
0.034 -2.98 * 
Clothing 0.064 -0.64 0.99 
Dwelling 
(charges) 
0.184 0.63 0.09 
Dwelling 
(equipment) 
0.032 0.27 0.88 
Transport and 
Communication 
0.078 -0.004 0.26 
Health 0.076 0.19 -0.15 
Culture and 
education 
0.065 0.12 0.26 
Miscellaneous 0.019 0.68 -1.17 
Weighted Mean  -0.91 0.68 
 
Source: Computed from GUS  Household Budget panel  (1994-1995) (4809 observation per year)  
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Conclusion 
 
The use of the survey describing at the individual and household levels different types of 
informal activities (working, buying, hiring) makes it possible to explore many new aspects of 
the mechanics of underground economies. The characteristics of participants in informal 
markets differ when considering various types of underground activities, but generally they 
are related to constrained employment. Firstly, the rural population appears as the main actor 
in informal markets, probably because of the income constraints, and also because labor 
markets are less developed in the countryside. Secondly, age and education levels do not seem 
to influence informal participation, which may indicate that such participation is more 
distributed over the whole population in Poland than in other countries. Thirdly, the average 
regional unemployment rate is positively related to informal participation, even when the 
influence of a household’s regular activity has already been taken into account. It may indicate 
the existence of a network effect: a larger supply of informal goods and services increases  a 
household’s exposure to informal activities, thus giving rise to greater household participation 
in informal markets. Last, single men and women are more active in the informal economy, 
while large families seem to be less prone to participating in informal markets than families 
with only one or two children.   It is possible that some supplementary cost of participating in 
the informal economy exists for larger families compared to smaller ones. 
The analysis of the characteristics of participants in informal markets thus confirms that 
working, buying and hiring in informal markets are mutually dependent. This is particularly 
the case of working and buying or hiring and buying, through “network effects”, whereby any 
contact with the underground economy facilitates other entries. We test the importance of 
these dependencies using a set of bivariate estimations. The probability of buying informally 
increases by 0.45 when a household shifts from not working informally to working informally. 
More generally, the shift in probability of participating in informal labor markets (working or 
hiring) from 0 to 1 increases the probability of buying by 0.48. These effects are particularly 
high, when compared with the average participation in informal consumer markets of 0.15.  
This confirms the interest in testing a structural model such as proposed by Fortin et al, 2002, 
in order to analyze the dependencies between various informal market participations and the 
potentially associated social stigma.  
We analyze the possible existence of this network effect also indirectly, comparing the 
cross-section and time-series differences of income elasticities observed for participating and 
non-participating households. This analysis, based on a matching method combining a labor 
force survey and a family budget survey, in fact shows that a household’s consumer behavior 
does depend (either negatively or positively) on the commodity group, and on informal market 
participation by the household. Moreover, the difference between the cross-section and the 
time-series estimates of the income effect is lowered by the presence of a participation 
probability among the explanatory variables, which is an important indication that this 
participation acts as a proxy for a lot of latent variables which cause the endogeneity biases in 
the cross-section estimates. It may be important to take into account an imputed participation 
rate to be able to estimate income-elasticities on the cross-section lowering the endogeneity 
bias. The shadow prices indicating the presence of constraints or non-monetary resources 
(such as those proceeding from a hidden time constraint) seem to depend on a household’s 
participation in the informal economy.  This indicates that those participating households may 
face different economic costs which explain their participation in informal markets.  
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APPENDIX  A 
Data Sources 
 
Unregistered Economy Survey (Extended Labor Force Survey (ELFS), GUS 1995 
 
The new phenomenon of informal employment as a collateral consequence of emerging and 
increasingly dramatic unemployment was the main motivation for a special study conducted 
by the Polish Statistical Office (GUS) in 1995. One of the most important points of interest 
was the probable over-estimation of the scale of formal unemployment due to the evaluation 
of the number of formally unemployed persons working in unregistered activities, induced 
both by tax evasion in the new private sector and by the possible combining of unemployment 
benefit with informal work. A large scale survey was launched with questions on hidden 
market activities as a part of the regular Labor Force Survey (LFS). LFS is a household based 
survey. Ordinary dwellings are selected in a two-step sampling method. The working status 
questions apply to household members aged 15 and more. A specific questionnaire was 
elaborated and presented to half of the households selected for the quarterly LFS. A principle 
was adopted in using this study relating to the sub-sample of persons finishing their 
cooperation with GUS, after having participated in three consecutive waves of the LFS. In 
total over 11000 households took part in the study, and the information about 25,600 persons 
living in Poland was collected. Only 546 persons refused to take part in the survey. The survey 
was performed in August 1995. 
The main features of the hidden economy survey were: 
-Its nationwide character: thanks to the modular character of the survey matched with 
the LFS study, all information is representative for the whole population and by applying 
appropriate weights, national estimates can be obtained.      
 -Common core variables with the LFS study: in addition to specifically “hidden 
market” questions, all socio-economic information on households is taken from the LFS 
study. 
 -The demand and supply sides of the phenomenon: information was collected on both 
the demand for informal work and supply of labor in the hidden economy, by asking 
corresponding questions of workers and persons running a private business. 
-Informal work characteristics: the distinction was made between persons working 
only in the hidden sector and those combining work in the formal and hidden ones. 
-Different types of informal jobs were distinguished. 
Detailed characteristics of all types of activities in the informal sector are given: hidden 
market consumption characteristics, reasons for taking an informal job, as well as incomes 
and expenditures in hidden markets. 
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Table A1 
Descriptive Statistics  
Variable  Mean Std. Dev. 
Head of household unemployed .0383061 .1919434 
Head of household working .360924 .4802916 
Head of household male .6842156 .4648499 
Head of household female .3157844 .4648499 
County (Wojewodztwo) with  
unemployment below the national 
average. 
.4475457 .4972649 
County (Wojewodztwo with average 
unemployment .2980751 .4574347 
County (Wojewodztwo with 
unemployment above the national 
average 
.240231 .4272442 
Head of household aged less than 30 .0787295 .2693291 
Head of household aged  30 - 39 .2102021 .4074717 
Head of household aged 40 - 60 .4159769 .4929133 
Head of household aged more than 60 .2950914 .4561058 
City  > 100000 inhabitants .2963426 .4566659 
City  20000-99999 inhabitants .2056785 .404216 
City 2000 -19999 inhabitants .125794 .331633 
Countryside .3721848 .4834106 
University level education .114052 .3178897 
High school level education .2454283 .4303616 
Primary school level education .5891242 .4920164 
No diploma .0513956 .2208139 
Wage earners .453513 .4978582 
Farmers .0897016 .2857676 
Dual activity (farmers+workers) .0459095 .209299 
Pensioners .3637151 .4810912 
Self-employed .0149182 .1212314 
No children .1663138 .37238 
One child .4366699 .4959969 
Two children .2142445 .4103169 
Three children or more .1827719 .386498 
                 , 
                  Number of observations:10390 
                 Source: Extended Labor Force Survey (ELFS), GUS 1995) 
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The Polish Household Budget Surveys (HBS) and Panels  
 
 
Household budget surveys have been conducted in Poland for many years. In the period 
analyzed, the total annual sample size was about 30,000 households, which represents 
approximately 0.3% of all households in Poland. The data were collected by a rotation 
method, on a quarterly basis. The master sample consists of households and persons living in 
randomly selected dwellings. To generate it, a two stage (and in the second stage, a two phase) 
sampling procedure was used. The full description of the master sample generating procedure 
is given by Kordos et al. (1991). 
 Master samples for each year contain data for four different sub-samples. Two sub-
samples started to be surveyed in 1986 (1992, 1996) and ended with the four-year survey 
period in 1990 (1996, 2000). They were replaced by new sub-samples in 1990 (1993, 2000). 
Another two sub-samples of the same size were started in 1987 (1993, 1997) and followed 
through to 1990 (1996, 2000). 
 For this four-year period for every annual sub-sample, it is possible to identify 
households participating in the surveys in all four years. The checked and tested number of 
households is 3707 and 3052 for the earlier and later panels respectively. The available 
information is as detailed as for the cross-sectional surveys: all typical socio-economic 
characteristics of households and individuals are present, as well as details on income and 
expenditures. 
 The period 1987-1990 covered by the Polish panel is unusual even in Polish economic 
history. It represents the shift from a centrally planned, rationed economy (1987) to a 
relatively unconstrained fully liberal market economy (1990). Thus, the transitory years 1988 
and 1989 produced a period of a very high inflation and a mixture of free-market, shadow and 
administrated economy. The 1993-1996 panel reflects the main transition period, the 1997-
2000 period corresponds to the post-transition, high economic growth period, with relatively 
low inflation, decreasing unemployment and a generally improved socio-economic situation in 
the context of an almost totally liberalized economy. 
In our estimations, we use both a three year period 1994-1996 of the 1993-19964 panel, 
and cross-section data for 1995 containing the same variables. The number of households (our 
observation unit) in the panel is 4809, and about 32000 in 1995 survey. For descriptive 
statistics see Table A2. 
 
 
                                                     
4
 The year 1993 was not used because of the absence of some variables in the version we had.  
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Table A2 
Descriptive Statistics 
  (Household  Budget Survey -HBS- 1995) 
 
Variable  Mean Std. Dev. 
total income 1226,055 1163,859 
total expenditure| 1120,649 909,641 
average head's age 48,664 14,563 
head of household aged less than 30 0,101 0,301 
head of household aged  30-40 0,226 0,418 
head of household aged  40-60 0,436 0,496 
head of household aged more than 60 0,237 0,425 
number of adults in household 2,423 1,409 
number of children 0,769 1,146 
city  250000 and more 0,350 0,477 
city 50000 -250 000 | 0,186 0,389 
city less than 50000 0,126 0,331 
countryside (less than 2000) 0,338 0,473 
workers| 0,440 0,496 
farmers| 0,065 0,247 
dual activity (farmers+workers) 0,053 0,223 
Pensioners 0,346 0,476 
Self-employed 0,137 0,296 
number of children=2 0,141 0,348 
number of children=3 0,166 0,372 
number of children=4 0,059 0,235 
number of children more than 4 0,026 0,160 
university and post secondary diploma 0,119 0,324 
secondary school 0,282 0,450 
primary school 0,576 0,494 
no diploma 0,023 0,151 
food budget share  0,448 0,151 
alcohol and tobacco budget share 0,034 0,044 
clothing budget share 0,064 0,077 
dwelling budget share 0,184 0,131 
furniture budget share 0,032 0,067 
health budget share 0,042 0,056 
hygiene budget share 0,034 0,025 
culture  budget share 0,018 0,036 
education budget share 0,047 0,068 
transport and communication budget share 0,078 0,090 
miscellaneous 0,019 0,046 
                             Number of observations:31857 
          Source: GUS, Household Budget Survey 1995
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APPENDIX  B 
Estimation Reasults 
                                                   
Table B1 
Probability of Participating (Buying, Working or Hiring) in Informal Markets: 
Logistic Function Estimates (Data on Households) 
Summary table 
Variable Participating(1) Working(2) Buying(3) Hiring(4) 
INTERCEPT -0,429 0,227  0,211 0,369  
Head of household inactive -0,491 0,106  (ns) 0,097 0,186 
Head of household unemployed 0,372 0,127 0,193 0,715 
Head of household working reference reference reference reference 
Head of household male -0,319 0,072 0,069(ns)  0,121 (ns) 
Head of household female reference reference reference reference 
Local unemployment  below the national average -0,145 0,073 0,065 (ns) 0,105 
Local  unemployment equal to average 
unemployment reference reference reference reference 
Local  unemployment above the national average 0,038 (ns) 0,079 0,075 (ns) 0,117 
Head of household aged less than 30 reference reference reference reference 
Head of household aged 30 - 39 -0,050 (ns) 0,114 0,119 (ns) 0,171 (ns) 
Head of household aged 40 - 60 -0,113 (ns) 0,113 0,117 (ns) 0,168 (ns) 
Head of household aged more than 60 -0,117 (ns) 0,147 0,137 0,203 
City  > 100 000 inhabitants reference reference reference reference 
City  20 000-99 999 inhabitants -0,043 (ns) 0,098 (ns) 0,089 (ns) 0,257 
City 2000-19 999 inhabitants 0,057 (ns) 0,109 (ns) 0,106 (ns) 0,256 
Countryside 0,422 0,089 0,081 0,217 
University level education -0,046 (ns) 0,193 0,160 0,292 (ns) 
High school level education -0,300  0,175 0,148 (ns) 0,234 
Primary school level education -0,124 (ns) 0,160 0,135 (ns) 0,204 
No diploma reference reference reference reference 
Wage earners reference reference reference reference 
Farmers 0,842 0,104  0,090 0,112 
Dual activity (farmers+wage earners) 0,328 0,135 (ns) 0,115 0,130 
Pensioners 0,209 0,107 (ns) 0,101 0,159 
Self-employed 0,560 0,219 0,298 (ns) n 
No children reference reference reference reference 
One child -0,762 0,136 0,112 (ns) 0,207 (ns) 
Two children -0,282 0,087 0,083 (ns) 0,119 (ns) 
Three children and more -0,152 0,089 0,087 (ns) 0,120 
 
1 Log likelihood = -5719.4899, LR chi2(21)= 670.58, Prob > chi2 =0.0000, Number of obs= 10390, 
2 Log likelihood = -3623.511, LR chi2(21) =497.20, Prob > chi2=0.0000, , Number of obs= 10390 
3Log likelihood = -4270.665, LR chi2(21) =422.64, Prob > chi2=0.0000, , Number of obs= 10390 
4 Log likelihood= -1841.554, LR chi2(20) =1675.70, Prob> chi2 =0.0000, Number of obs =10235 
(ns) not significant 
Source: Computed from GUS Extended Labor Force Survey  (1995), 10039 obs. 
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Table B2 
Probability of Buying and Working in Informal Markets           
Recursive bivariate probit model  
 
| Coef. 
Robust St. 
Error z P>|z| 
Working equation   |     
     
Head of household unemployed 0,538 0,074 7,290 0,000 
Inactive -0,037 0,057 -0,650 0,519 
Local unemployment below the national average. -0,145 0,039 -3,750 0,000 
Local unemployment above the national average 0,067 0,043 1,560 0,118 
Head of household aged less than 30 -0,147 0,063 -2,320 0,021 
Head of household aged 30 - 39 -0,225 0,063 -3,590 0,000 
Head of household aged 40 - 60 -0,549 0,079 -6,980 0,000 
City  20000-99999 inhabitants -0,048 0,050 -0,950 0,344 
City below 20000 inhabitants 0,007 0,057 0,130 0,899 
Countryside 0,135 0,046 2,940 0,003 
University level education -0,363 0,099 -3,680 0,000 
High school level education -0,396 0,090 -4,420 0,000 
Primary school level education -0,202 0,082 -2,460 0,014 
Farmers 0,086 0,059 1,460 0,143 
Dual activity (farmers+wage earners) -0,023 0,075 -0,310 0,757 
Pensioners 0,004 0,059 0,070 0,948 
Self-employed 0,391 0,124 3,150 0,002 
One child 0,295 0,059 5,020 0,000 
Two children 0,403 0,065 6,240 0,000 
Three children or more 0,564 0,068 8,350 0,000 
Constant -1,022 0,116 -8,840 0,000 
     
Buying equation            
     
Working in informal markets (instrumented) 1,963 0,578 3,400 0,001 
Head of household unemployed -0,656 0,141 -4,660 0,000 
Inactive -0,341 0,054 -6,280 0,000 
Head of household aged less than 30 0,126 0,068 1,860 0,063 
Head of household aged  30 - 39 0,140 0,071 1,970 0,048 
Head of household aged 40 - 60 0,366 0,097 3,770 0,000 
University level education 0,269 0,095 2,830 0,005 
High school level education 0,128 0,090 1,420 0,155 
Primary school level education 0,082 0,076 1,070 0,283 
Farmers 0,621 0,057 10,840 0,000 
Dual activity (farmers+wage earners) 0,291 0,068 4,270 0,000 
Pensioners 0,241 0,056 4,290 0,000 
Self employed -0,039 0,161 -0,250 0,806 
One child -0,015 0,052 -0,290 0,775 
Two children -0,061 0,065 -0,940 0,350 
Three children or more -0,134 0,084 -1,580 0,114 
constant -1,559 0,141 -11,060 0,000 
rho  0,088 0,024   
 
Log pseudolikelihood = -7922.7008 ,  Wald chi2(36)   =     785.11 Prob > chi2 = 0.00, Number of obs =10390, ,Wald test of rho=0: 
chi2(1) = 13.243    Prob > chi2 = 0.0003 
 Source: Computed from GUS Extended Labor Force Survey  (1995) 10039 obs. 
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Probability of Buying and Working in Informal Markets           
Recursive bivariate probit model  
 marginal effects 
variable dy/dx St. Error, Average 
    
Working in informal markets 
(instrumented) 0,451 0,133 0,123 
Head of household unemployed -0,106 0,014 0,038 
Inactive -0,075 0,011 0,361 
Head of household aged less than 
30 0,030 0,017 0,210 
Head of household aged  30 - 39 0,033 0,017 0,416 
Head of household aged 40 - 60 0,091 0,026 0,295 
University level education 0,068 0,026 0,114 
High school level education 0,030 0,022 0,245 
Primary school level education 0,019 0,017 0,589 
Farmers 0,179 0,020 0,090 
Dual activity (farmers+wage 
earners) 0,076 0,020 0,046 
Pensioners 0,057 0,014 0,364 
Self employed -0,009 0,035 0,015 
One child -0,003 0,012 0,437 
Two children -0,014 0,014 0,214 
Three children or more -0,029 0,018 0,183 
    
 
y  =Pr(buying )=1;, dy/dx is for discrete change  of dummy variable 
 from 0 to 1 at the average point, Number of obs:10390                                                   
Source: Computed from GUS  Extended Labor Force Survey  (1995),  10390 obs. 
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Table B3 
Probability of Buying and Hiring in Informal markets           
Recursive bivariate probit model  
 
variable Coef, 
Robust  St, 
Error z P>|z| 
     
Hiring equation            
     
Head of household unemployed -0,823 0,247 -3,340 0,001 
Inactive -1,180 0,097 -12,170 0,000 
Local unemployment below the national 
average. 0,141 0,048 2,940 0,003 
Local unemployment above the national 
average 0,056 0,053 1,070 0,286 
Head of household aged less than 30 -0,026 0,085 -0,310 0,754 
Head of household aged  30 - 39 -0,002 0,084 -0,020 0,985 
Head of household aged 40 - 60 0,318 0,105 3,030 0,002 
City  20000-99999 inhabitants 0,222 0,100 2,230 0,026 
City below 20000 inhabitants 0,462 0,100 4,600 0,000 
Countryside 0,741 0,082 9,040 0,000 
University level education -0,216 0,131 -1,650 0,099 
High school level education -0,261 0,111 -2,360 0,018 
Primary school level education -0,169 0,098 -1,730 0,084 
Farmers 1,092 0,061 17,880 0,000 
Dual activity (farmers+wage earners) 0,499 0,076 6,560 0,000 
Pensioners 0,402 0,091 4,410 0,000 
One child 0,299 0,078 3,840 0,000 
Two children 0,421 0,085 4,940 0,000 
Three children or more 0,298 0,091 3,280 0,001 
Constant -2,334 0,159 -14,680 0,000 
     
Buying equation        |     
     
Hiring on informal markets (instrumented) | 2,165 0,354 6,120 0,000 
Head of household unemployed -0,214 0,103 -2,090 0,037 
Inactive -0,085 0,067 -1,270 0,205 
Head of household aged less than 30 0,076 0,066 1,160 0,245 
Head of household aged  30 - 39 0,056 0,065 0,860 0,388 
Head of household aged 40 - 60 0,094 0,077 1,220 0,224 
University level education 0,221 0,088 2,510 0,012 
High school level education 0,066 0,082 0,800 0,422 
Primary school level education 0,044 0,075 0,580 0,559 
Farmers -0,045 0,132 -0,340 0,734 
Dual activity (farmers+wage earners) -0,040 0,089 -0,450 0,655 
Pensioners 0,094 0,059 1,600 0,110 
One child 0,017 0,048 0,350 0,729 
Two children -0,025 0,056 -0,450 0,654 
Three children or more 0,012 0,059 0,200 0,842 
constant -1,335 0,104 -12,860 0,000 
rho  0,764 0,016   
 
Log pseudolikelihood = -5601.4322,  Wald chi2(34)=1329.77 Prob > chi2=.0000Wald test of rho=0: chi2(1)=712.593 
Prob > chi2 = 0.0000, Number of obs =10390                                                   
Source: Computed from GUS  Extended Labor Force Survey  (1995,) 10390 observations 
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Probability of buying and hiring on informal markets           
Recursive bivariate probit model  
 marginal effects* 
 
variable  dy/dx St. Error, Average 
Hiring on informal markets (instrumented) 0,499 0,082 0,073 
Household’s head Unemployed -0,044 0,019 0,033 
Inactive -0,019 0,015 0,358 
Household’s head age less than 30 0,018 0,016 0,210 
Household’s head age  30 – 39 0,013 0,015 0,417 
Household’s head age 40 – 60 0,022 0,019 0,298 
University level education 0,056 0,024 0,115 
High school level education 0,015 0,020 0,245 
Primary school level education 0,010 0,017 0,589 
Farmers -0,010 0,029 0,091 
Double active (farmers+wage earners) -0,009 0,020 0,047 
Pensioneers 0,022 0,014 0,369 
One child 0,004 0,011 0,438 
Two children -0,006 0,013 0,216 
Three children or more 0,003 0,014 0,185 
 
y  =Pr(achat=1),, dy/dx is for discrete change of dummy variable  from 0 to 1 at the average point   
 Number of obs:10390                                                   
Source: Computed from GUS  Extended Labor Force Survey  (1995) 
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Table B4 
Probability of Working or Hiring Versus Buying on Informal Markets 
Recursive bivariate probit model 
 
variable     
 
Working or hiring equation Coef, 
Robust  
Std, Error z P>|z| 
     
Head of household unemployed 0,356 0,072 4,910 0,000 
Inactive -0,390 0,057 -6,890 0,000 
Local unemployment below the national average. -0,091 0,035 -2,590 0,010 
Local unemployment above the national average 0,057 0,040 1,450 0,148 
Head of household aged less than 30 -0,104 0,061 -1,700 0,088 
Head of household aged  30 - 39 -0,161 0,060 -2,660 0,008 
Head of household aged 40 - 60 -0,261 0,075 -3,490 0,000 
City  20000-99999 inhabitants 0,006 0,048 0,130 0,900 
City below 20000 inhabitants 0,121 0,054 2,240 0,025 
Countryside 0,309 0,043 7,180 0,000 
University level education -0,371 0,089 -4,180 0,000 
High school level education -0,416 0,080 -5,210 0,000 
Primary school level education -0,205 0,073 -2,830 0,005 
Farmers 0,664 0,054 12,390 0,000 
Dual activity (farmers+wage earners) 0,233 0,068 3,440 0,001 
Pensioners 0,133 0,057 2,310 0,021 
Self-employed 0,508 0,125 4,060 0,000 
One child 0,336 0,054 6,240 0,000 
Two children 0,471 0,059 8,010 0,000 
Three children or more 0,562 0,062 9,010 0,000 
constant -1,041 0,106 -9,850 0,000 
     
Buying equation             
     
Hiring or working  2,101 0,388 5,410 0,000 
Head of household unemployed -0,547 0,111 -4,930 0,000 
Inactive -0,116 0,064 -1,820 0,068 
Head of household aged less than 30 0,120 0,066 1,820 0,068 
Head of household aged  30 - 39 0,138 0,067 2,070 0,039 
Head of household aged 40 - 60 0,286 0,079 3,610 0,000 
University level education 0,363 0,096 3,770 0,000 
High school level education 0,216 0,091 2,380 0,018 
Primary school level education 0,114 0,077 1,490 0,137 
Farmers 0,090 0,123 0,730 0,463 
Dual activity (farmers+wage earners) 0,053 0,080 0,660 0,511 
Pensioners 0,125 0,057 2,170 0,030 
Self-employed -0,143 0,158 -0,910 0,364 
One child -0,055 0,052 -1,060 0,288 
Two children -0,134 0,066 -2,030 0,042 
Three children or more -0,189 0,077 -2,450 0,014 
constant | -1,654 0,130 -12,700 0,000 
rho | 0,414 0,018   
Log pseudolikelihood = -8403.3828, Prob > chi2=0.0000, Wald chi2(36)=1123.63, Nb. of obs=10390 
Wald test of rho=0:chi2(1)= 396.875,Prob>chi2=0.0000, Number of obs =10390                                                   
Source: Computed from GUS  Extended Labor Force Survey  (1995) 
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Probability of working or hiring and buying on informal markets 
Recursive bivariate probit model 
marginal effects 
 
variable   dy/dx Std. Err. Average 
Working or hiring 0,484 0,089 0,179 
Head of household unemployed -0,095 0,013 0,038 
Inactive -0,026 0,014 0,361 
Head of household aged less than 
30 0,029 0,016 0,448 
Head of household aged  30 - 39 0,032 0,016 0,240 
Head of household aged 40 - 60 0,070 0,020 0,210 
University level education 0,096 0,029 0,416 
High school level education 0,053 0,023 0,295 
Primary school level education 0,026 0,017 0,206 
Farmers 0,022 0,031 0,126 
Dual activity (farmers+wage 
earners) 0,013 0,019 0,372 
Pensioners 0,029 0,014 0,114 
Self-employed -0,031 0,031 0,245 
One child -0,013 0,012 0,589 
Two children -0,030 0,014 0,090 
Three children or more -0,041 0,016 0,046 
 
y  =Pr(achat=1),, dy/dx is for discrete change of dummy  variable from 0 to 1 
 at the average point, Number of obs:10390                                                   
Source: Computed from GUS  Extended Labor Force Survey  (1995) 
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Table B5 
Panel AI Demand System, Estimates of the Change in Budget Shares for the Probability of 
Participation in Informal Markets 
 
 
Income 
Elasticity Specifiction Parameter  Likelihood 
Food 0.6035 B 0.19772                    
   (2.7542)          
 0.70354 W  0.216550  
   (15.43)  
 0.8663 QGLS 0.19392            282.90317 
   (2.9178 )     
Alcohol and tobacco 1.0814 B 0.03736            
   (1.74516)         
 0.6554   W 0.0102         
   (2.69 )         
 1.1336 QGLS 0.038445            68.213459 
      (1.99720 )   
Clothing 1.0719 B -0.05575                   
   (1.48440)         
 1.19621  W 0.00281                   
   (4.06)                      
 1.1513 QGLS -0.05221       104.66421       
   (1.53260 )  
Dwelling  (charges) 0.7847 B -0.05002                      
   (0.8158  )              
 0.90667 W -0.0205                  
   (-18,07)  
 0.8645 QGLS -0.03783  69.384424       
   (0.6985 )  
Dwelling (equip) 2.1186 B -0.01947               
   (0.67645)         
 2.348  W 0.0046             
   (0.81 )         
 1.4644  QGLS -0.030226       96.776936                
   (1.21118 )   
Health 1.055 B -0.09882             
   (4.10473)         
 1.1525 W -0.0339                  
   (-7.29)          
 1.006 QGLS -0.10067   69.719117 
      (4.91130)  
Hygiene 1.0370 B 0.009655                  
   (0.85566)                     
 0.8222 W -0.0107            
   (4.87 )                      
 0.8925 QGLS 0.008448    42.117644  
   ( 0.85041)  
Education 1.1159 B -0.01160                  
   (0.60331                       
 0.99828 W 0.0109                       
   (3.17 )         
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 0.6575 QGLS -0.004322          105.40015     
Culture   (-0.24917 )  
 1.7616 B -0.15015                   
   (4.6641 )            
 1.312 W -0.0525                  
   (-8.41 )         
 1.1516  QGLS -0.13177        89.267688 
   (4.3626 )          
Transp. &com. 1.9853 B 0.10087                           
   (2.6459 )         
 1.81 W 0.0259                           
   (3.36)          
 2.822 QGLS 0.06490           675.89938 
   (1.6998)  
 
B= between estimates, W= within estimates, QGLS = Quasi Generalized Least Squares estimates 
1.Student (robust) statistics in parenthesis 
2.Income instrumented by total expenditure and  socio-demographic variables. 
3.Income elasticities computed at the average level of budget share 
Source: Computed from GUS Household Budget panel  (1994-1995) (4809 observation per year) 
. 
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Table B6 
 Total Expenditure Elasticities 
Panel QAIDS (system) estimates 
 
 Participation 
coefficient 
Non-
participants 
Partici 
pants 
Participation 
coefficient 
Non- 
participants 
Partici 
pants 
 Between estimates Within estimates 
Food 
 
-0.011 
(.054) 
0.604 
(.020) 
0.683 
(.067) 
-0.2x10-7 
(5x10-7) 
0.490 
(.0271) 
0.307 
(.083) 
Alcohol + 
tobacco 
0.030 
(.017) 
0.999 
(.006) 
0.992 
(.021) 
ns 0.401 
(.090) 
-0.099 
(.285) 
Clothing 
 
-0.019 
(.028) 
1.397 
(.059) 
0.967 
(.209) 
ns 1.058 
(.091) 
1.911 
(.279) 
Dwelling 
(charges) 
-0.033 
(.047) 
0.890 
(.040) 
1.352 
(.188) 
ns 1.300 
(.059) 
1.414 
(.244) 
Dwelling 
(equipment) 
0.66x10-4 
(.023) 
1.871 
(.059) 
1.256 
(.319) 
ns 2.160 
(.147) 
2.249 
(.386) 
Transport and 
com. 
0.94 
(.031) 
1.597 
(.051) 
1.843 
(.175) 
ns 1.594 
(.077) 
2.124 
(.232) 
Health 
 
-0.020 
(.022) 
1.145 
(.049) 
1.019 
(.223) 
ns 1.266 
(.071) 
0.948 
(.284) 
Culture  
Education 
-0.047 
(.020) 
0.897 
(.039) 
0.881 
(.206) 
ns 0.955 
(.042) 
1.011 
(.231) 
Miscellaneous 
 
0.028 
(.017) 
1.757 
(.102) 
2.306 
(.350) 
-0.8x10-8 
(.75x10-8) 
2.164 
(.158) 
1.454 
(.420) 
 
Qaids Specification: wiht = αi + Σj γij ln pjt + βi ln [mht/a(pt)] + {[λi/b(pt)] ln [m/a(p)]}2 + Wht.γi + uiht with ln a(pt) =  α0 + Σj αi ln pit +0.5 
ΣiΣj γij ln pit. ln pjt  and b(pt) = Πi pitβi  
Logarithm of total Expenditures instrumented. 
Other determinants : logarithmic age of the head, proportion of children in the family, relative logarithmic prices, education and location 
dummies, quarter dummies for each year. The true price index is approximated by a Stone price index. 
Estimation Method : by convergence, 75th iteration estimated on pooled cross-sections, on the integrability parameter b(p). Additivity 
constrained.  
ns : Not significant 
Source: Computed from GUS Household Budget panel (1994-1995) (4809 observation per year) 
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